From 37mm to 6- Pounder
Glider Cargo - Artillery Weapons - Guest Post by Ben Powers
It’s my pleasure to welcome Ben Powers to the Substack page. Ben is sharing this first of two articles he has written for us on the artillery weapons carried by glider. Ben is well qualified to author this post. He is the author of Never a Dull Moment: The 80th Airborne Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion in World War II. I have linked additional information about Ben as well as links to his podcast at the end of the article.
Ben and I connected on my FB group Combat Glider Pilots of WWII. His expertise in this field became readily apparent, and he graciously accepted my request to write a few articles on the howitzers that gliders hauled and to clear up some of the confusion that exists about them.
From 37MM to 6-Pounder
By Ben Powers, author of “Never A Dull Moment: The 80th Airborne Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion in WW II”
One of the most interesting units of the American airborne during the Second World War was the Airborne Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion. Despite its designation, the battalion really functioned as what Steven Zaloga described as a “heavy weapons unit”.[1] By 1942, the War Department had determined the shape its anti-tank formations would take. Since anti-tank weapons were direct-fire, light cannons, the Army entrusted them with the troops who had experience with similar weapons. Anti-aircraft artillerymen, assigned to the old Coast Artillery Branch, performed an amalgam of functions that the field artillery had no interest in performing and found themselves cast in the role of anti-tank gunners. Thus, as the Army Ground Forces transformed the infantry division structure from the larger, four-regiment square divisions of World War I to the triangular three-regiment division, it assigned each division an anti-aircraft battalion tasked to perform both the air-defense and anti-armor roles.
The airborne anti-aircraft battalion consisted of six batteries: three anti-tank (AT) batteries armed with eight 37mm AT guns divided into two platoons of four, for a total of 24 cannons, and three anti-aircraft batteries armed with 12 .50-caliber machine guns, divided into three platoons of four, for a total of 26 AAA guns. Originally intended to operate with one battery of AT guns and one battery of antiaircraft weapons supporting each of an airborne divisions three infantry regiments, as the war went on standard practice emerged to retain the batteries under division control and employ them where most needed during combat. [2] Smaller, additional quantities of anti-tank guns were found in the glider infantry regiments and artillery battalion, as well as the airborne engineer battalion.
The role of the anti-tank was relatively new when America entered World War Two. The U.S. Army came late to recognize that armor would play a significant role on the battlefield. Lessons from the First World War identified the infantry as the supreme arm, with artillery taking a supporting role and the tank an incarnation of rolling artillery. Despite the potential that mechanization had to change the character of combat, with the promise of delivering heavy, mobile fire that could be massed against objectives, and the fact that artillery proved to be the most prolific killer on the battlefields of France, American officers chose to view the success of their infantry as proof that the individual rifleman ruled supreme. They were seen as the men who restored open warfare to its rightful place after years of stalemate and trench warfare on the Western Front. As a result, while many interwar theorists considered the potential of fast, well-armed, and protected armor formations in wars of the future, the U.S. Army consigned tanks to a supporting function, tied to the slower pace of the dismounted infantryman.
Because of this reactionary viewpoint, defending infantry against armor was initially neglected. Dismounted infantry tactics stressed fighting against similarly armed infantry, with little thought given to fighting tanks. As time passed after the end of World War I, from 1918 to the 1930s, almost no attention was given to anti-tank weaponry. As the 1930s progressed, and war clouds began to gather over Europe once more, along with reports of German and Russian experiments with heavy armor formations, the War Department determined it was time to add some anti-armor capability to its infantry formations.
In keeping with the idea that dismounted infantry would remain the key to maneuver and offensive power in combat, the Army directed its Ordnance Department to look at anti-tank cannons that could be moved over rough terrain by small groups of men on foot. This requirement, almost by definition, removed all but the lightest cannons from consideration. Not only would the gun and its carriage need to be lightweight enough to be moved by dismounted troops, but the ammunition would also have to be carried using manpower instead of horsepower. As a result, the engineers at the Army Ordnance Department quickly settled on a variation of the 37mm gun.
From the end of the 19th century through the end of World War I and beyond, 37mm cannons had seen a spate of popularity in European armies. Initially, the round was a favorite of countries that were signatories to the Hague Convention of 1899, which limited the size and destructive capability of explosive projectiles, at a time when the idea of conducting a humane war was not considered an oxymoron. The 37mm shell was the largest type of ammunition that could be fielded and not violate the terms of the convention. As time went on, variations of the 37mm proved highly successful for the very reasons noted by American planners: its light weight, mobility, and maneuverability. At a time when armor on the battlefield was not a consideration or at least a prime consideration, such as 1916, these factors made considerable military sense. However, as tanks grew bigger and faster, with thicker armor, the advantages of the 37mm gun faded rapidly. But as the United States had won its war in 1918, the lessons of that victory became enshrined as doctrine, although the world had moved on. However, the U.S. Army’s infantry-centric approach to arming its formations led to the selection of the 37mm as the primary anti-tank gun for divisional anti-tank battalions. By 1942, there was ample evidence collected as lessons learned from Allied countries fighting Axis forces that the 37mm cannon was already outmoded.[3]
The M3 37mm cannon’s primary selling point for airborne troops was its mobility. Weighing in at less than 1000 pounds, with a length of slightly less than 13 feet and a height just over 3 feet, the cannon easily fit in a WACO glider. On paper though, its firepower appeared impressive enough. The weapon possessed a maximum range of over four miles and was found to penetrate the turret of captured German armor at 300 yards and the hull at 600 yards. Reports from combat showed the weapon was less effective. Its combat debut against German tanks came in North Africa revealed that the 37mm required gun teams to be within 100 yards of enemy armor to achieve a disabling strike.[4]
Despite these reports from the field, the airborne community continued to focus on mobility and air transportability as primary considerations. The Army Ordnance Corps conducted a series of experiments at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, using 75mm cannons from World War I modified for direct fire, mounted on AT gun carriages, to provide a quickly available source of heavier firepower. This experiment failed to generate much interest from the operational Army.[5] However, the potential of a 75mm airborne AT gun is an interesting what-if. The airborne field artillery had success with glider-borne and parachute-delivered 75mm pack howitzers during World War II. A similarly armed anti-tank battalion could have been a significant force multiplier for an airborne division. To deal with heavier German armor the United States Army Ordnance Corps did begin development a more powerful, 57mm AT gun with greater penetrating power, but Airborne Command continued to equip its AT units with 37mm cannons because the larger and heavier 57mm gun could not fit properly in a glider for use in air assaults.[6]
The experience of the 82d Airborne Division’s 80th Airborne Antiaircraft Artillery battalion is illustrative of the challenges of obtaining proper firepower. When the 80th deployed overseas to North Africa in the spring of 1943, they began to learn more about German armor from veteran units, including British AT troops. The 80th’s leaders discovered they needed heavier firepower than its original armament of 37mm anti-tank guns. The British guns also utilized 57mm shells but fired high explosives (HE), which proved more effective against enemy armor, and, more importantly, the 6pdr’s carriage possessed a narrower wheelbase, which facilitated loading the weapon onto a glider. The fact that the British gun could be easily transported by air eliminated the only advantage the 37mm cannon provided to airborne forces. After a lot of trial and error, the 80th discovered that British 6-pounder cannons fit the bill between air transportability and combat power.[7]
The 80th’s leadership took advantage of their proximity to veteran troops and met with British officers who had experience fighting against German Mark IV and Tiger I Panzers. Both tanks had frontal armor between 3 and 4 inches thick, and the British confirmed that the 80th’s anti-tank batteries were seriously under-gunned. Even though the 80th’s gunners did not yet have access to heavier cannons, the battalion’s commander arranged for an informal training program with the British. Each week the 80th AAA would exchange non-commissioned officers (NCOs) with the British, to work with their 6pdr anti-tank gun. The 6-pounder was the British version of the 57mm cannon and, with the correct types of armor-piercing ammunition, capable of penetrating 2.9 to 3.9 inches of armor at 1,000 meters. The training program provided the 80th’s NCOs with familiarization with the technical aspects of the weapon and introduced them to effective tactics for dealing with enemy tanks.
In addition to the training program with their British allies, the 80th’s leadership endeavored to up-gun the anti-tank batteries. With the assistance of the 82nd Airborne Division staff, the 80th AAA Battalion received 18 6-pounder cannons from the British. The batteries divested themselves of the obsolete 37mm guns to take possession of the new cannons. This created a situation where each battery had two fewer guns, although they now had significantly greater firepower. The standard AT battery organization no longer worked in the 80th, as it was predicated on being equipped with eight cannons. Major Singleton gave his AT battery commanders significant leeway in reorganizing their units to adapt to the changes in weapons. The results varied, with Battery A fielding two platoons armed with three cannons each, and Battery B using three two-gun sections. C Battery came up with the most creative solution, organizing into a large platoon of four 6-pounders, supported by a two-gun section. C Battery’s organization provided a combination of concentrated stopping power backed by a more mobile capability that could be deployed to crisis points quickly. Such ad hoc arrangements were only temporary, and less than a year later with the 80th AAA Battalion participated in Operation Neptune, the initial invasion of Normandy, the battalion possessed a full complement of 57mm cannon. [8]
The AT batteries acquitted themselves well in that campaign, especially early on during the taking of crossing points over the Merderet River at Chef du Pont and La Fiere. The role of AT guns was recognized as so vital that the battalion expanded its antitank capability after Normandy. The anti-tank batteries sustained significant casualties in the opening fights of the campaign, necessitating shifting personnel from the anti-aircraft batteries to make up the losses. Battalion leaders realized the anti-aircraft batteries required cross-training on the 57mm anti-tank guns in case such a scenario occurred again. The battalion log records eight instances of anti-tank gunnery between 1 August and 29 August 1944. All six batteries of the battalion participated in the exercises. Additionally, the lack of enemy air threat in France, combined with the effectiveness of German armor, led to the 80th creating an additional anti-tank battery by converting one of the anti-aircraft batteries to anti-armor before September 1944. This training and reorganization paid off during Operation Market in September 1944, when Battery E deployed to Holland to an anti-tank battery.[9]
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Here is a bit more information about Ben. Ben Powers is a Life Member of the 82nd Airborne Association, an Honorary Member of the 80th AAA Battalion Association and hosts "The Commander’s Voice," a YouTube channel and podcast devoted to airborne subjects. Ben resides in Texas with his wife KC and their four children, Arthur, Michaela, Emma, and Jordan.
[1] Steven Zaloga, US Airborne Divisions in the ETO 1944-45, p 76.
[2] Clay Blair, Ridgway’s Paratroopers, p 42.
[3] Steven Zaloga, US Anti-tank Artillery 1941-45, p 6
[4] Steven Zaloga, US Anti-tank Artillery 1941-45, pp 11-12
[5] Zaloga, U.S. Anti-tank Artillery, 1941–45, 8.
[6] Zaloga, U.S. Anti-tank Artillery, 1941–45, 44.
[7] Powers, Never A Dull Moment, p. 34
[8] Powers, Never A Dull Moment, p. 35
[9] Powers, Never A Dull Moment, pp 62 – 90.