Glider Pilots in Operation MARKET

The Final Report

I will end this series on Operation MARKET with a report from F/O Robert Hill of the 313th TCG 29th TCS. He was in Serial A-38 which arrived on D+1 and assigned to LZ “N”.

F/O Hill voiced what many glider pilots cited as a concern/request “More emphasis on job and behavior on the ground infantry defense tactics.” I would like to focus on this statement for a moment. The glider pilots were not without any combat training, in fact those in the CBI were highly trained in jungle warfare. Many of the glider pilots in the ETO had prior military experience and were trained in the use of weapons. A few, like Captain Andross who I discuss in the previous posts and podcasts, had prior infantry experience. Because the quality of the training varied among Troop Carrier Groups, glider pilots were not always trained as other fighting units were. Some had conducted training exercises with the airborne while others did not.

This lack of training and fighting as a unit would possibly place the glider pilots at a distinct disadvantage if suddenly thrust into a well oiled machine such as the airborne. So to be clear, what is being repeatedly requested was more training with the airborne not basic infantry training. Hill specifically mentions defensive tactics. This would reflect the situation they had just found themselves in, holding the front against a German counter attack.

In what one can only hope was a major one time oversight Hill also stated “Glider pilots and power pilots should be briefed together. We were not even briefed on passwords. I had to get it from the pilot on the intercom.”

After landing and reporting to the glider pilot area Hill was sent to the frontline.

“Next morning guarded some prisoners and was relieved at noon and was sent to G.P Pool. That evening were were strafed by 12 ME 109s, next morning I was strafed by FW 190’s [Foke Wulf 109]. About 2200 Thurs. night Sept. 21st we were moved to the front lines to hold off possible attack. Our location was the south end of L.Z. “N”. Germany proper was across the L.Z. No direct assaults were experienced. Just fairly heavy mortar and 88mm fire was experienced. We were relieved Sunday Sept. 24th and met a convoy Monday noon to evacuate us. We were under the orders of Capt. Andross. That evening just after we crossed the canal at Veghel our convoy was hit by 2 self propelled 88 mm fire and approximately 100 German paratroopers. Our trucks were scattered, many trucks ahead were ablaze and 3 Sherman tanks that reinforced us were knocked out. A British truck driver was hit in the ribs. I dressed his wounds, during this the truck that was on the road, behind my former position and that of F/O’s R.L. Franks and Wm Crehan was hit and ablaze, cutting off any communications between us. I saw an S.P and a few Germans filtering through the woods. A couple minutes later a jeep came up and took the wounded English soldier to a hospital. I didn’t learn his name. I lost contact with the rest of the G.P.’s I met some 327 comp Infantry boys, stayed with them that night. Met the other G.P. in Uden the next day. The road was open about 1300 hrs. on Tues. and F/O Fosburgh and I got transportation to Brussels arriving there about 2100 hrs that evening.”

What all of these reports have in unison is the glider pilots’ requests for more infantry training. They were proficient in operating on their own, and followed the dual sets of orders they were given: report to the CP and make it back to base asap. Much criticism is placed on glider pilots for using their own judgement in regards to their actions. By the time of Operation VARSITY, these concerns were finally heard and changes implemented.

If you would like me to share more of these reports leave a comment and let me know,