Ground Activities of Glider Pilots in Operation MARKET

313th TCG

Glider being prepared for another mission Holland IX TCC Photo courtesy of Fold 3

For the background on this post and those that will follow on the 313th in Operation MARKET you can listen to the episode The Incredible Story of the 313th Troop Carrier Group Glider Pilots in Operation MARKET.

In most every published account I read of the this particular experience of glider pilots in MARKET, the narrative is the same. Glider pilots landed, they were asked to volunteer for the front lines, they stepped up, did a great job. In this same narrative General James Gavin wrote a scathing review of the glider pilots and their lack of training. I’ve been told the glider pilots being placed on the wrong convoy absolutely did not happen. Yet it did.

This narrative just doesn’t add up. Why did General Gavin write such a scathing review? Why did the glider pilots have such strong words about the entire experience afterwards? How did the failures between the two arms of the Army Air Forces (AAF), the air forces and the ground forces, to fully embrace, incorporate and train the glider pilots in both of their expected duties - flying and combat - impact this particular action? How did the glider pilots actually perform? If it was as poorly as Gavin described why were medals awarded to the men that commanded them in MARKET?

Before diving in further the obvious has to be stated and have to be applied to his analysis. Historians can take an extremely complex time and bundle it up nicely to be taught or read in a relatively short period of time such as a semester or a book. Reality is not so neat and requires a deep dive into the details. War is messy, organized chaos and sometimes just chaos. Battle is a fluid situation. Mistakes happen (thus the coinage of the term SNAFU), and plans change depending on the action. People die, are wounded while others are left virtually unscathed inches away. Airmen, corpsmen and soldiers sometimes are an autopilot and more often than we realize suffering from not only obvious injuries but less obvious such as concussions, mental fatigue and shock.

One persons version of the action can be different than the person standing right next to them and both can be correct. Battle is intense and soldiers are trained for professionalism to take over but there is always the human toll. Realizing that it also stands to reason that many after action reports, and narratives are written or recorded shortly after the action, therefore there may be a residual effect from the recent experiences of the writer in the writing. We should be cognizant of these factors. For just this reason, when I quote from an interrogation report or after action report I do not correct the spelling or punctuation, and will not do so here. I do this to honor the men and the frame of mind they were in at the time they wrote it.

GLIDER PILOTS WERE “MAVERICKS”

Members of the IX TCC hold a last minute briefing session prior to another glider mission in Holland Photo Courtesy of Fold 3

To understand any of this it is first necessary to understand and flesh out the situation of the glider pilots within Troop Carrier Command (TCC). Many unresolved challenges existed in the glider pilot program’s organization within the AAF and the TCC at the time of Operation MARKET.

One of those challenges, and one with a lasting effect which has continue to haunt the legacy of glider pilots to this day, was the lack of uniform organization, utilization and training of the them across the Troop Carrier Groups. I discuss this in much greater detail in my book Suicide Jockeys: The Making of the WWII Combat Glider Pilot. The powers that be in the military were well aware of these issues and only began to address them towards the latter part of the war, again these were still relevant at the time of of this mission.

Interviews of returnees conducted by Air Intelligence recorded the replies to the same or very similar set of questions which were asked over the years of the war. They give remarkable insight into the glider pilots experiences within different Troop Carrier Groups in the European Theater of Operations (ETO). Glider pilots in the ETO and China Burma India Theater (CBI) cannot be corralled into the same general heading under ‘glider pilots.’ The same experiences were not had with the glider pilots of First Air Commandos in the (CBI). The organizations differed, as well as the missions and issues. So we are specifically speaking about the ETO.

Air Intelligence asked returnees about their experiences with glider pilots within their own groups or squadrons, their organization within it and their utility. They did not ask this about tow pilots. This would confirm that the upper commands were aware, long before MARKET and afterwards, that this was an issue that was obviously not being addressed. The returnees questioned were a mix of pilots, glider pilots and commanders. Here are just a small sampling of their responses.

“There were approximately 15 glider pilots attached to each Squadron of my Group. These men were given some administrative duties, but due to the fact that they were continually shifted, the program did not work out either for the benefit of the Unit or of the individual. The glider pilots were very eager and willing, but their effort lacked organization and direction. The availability of the glider pilots' talent and manpower seems to be forgotten except during periods of preparation for missions.” Major Lee Hagerty, Pilot, Sqdn. CO, 64th TCG

“When gliders were first used tactically, small groups of glider pilots were attached to various troop carrier squadrons, and, frankly, the glider pilots were not treated well. Looked upon, as step children, they did not receive equal consideration with other members of the squadron. As a result the morale of glider pilots suffered throughout the theater, until Col. Manning, the Commanding Officer of the 51st Troop Carrier Wing. made the decision to organize a separate glider unit, designated the 51st Troop carrier Wing Glider Base. I was assigned to this outfit as Commanding Officer. From this time forth with our unit was functioning as a separate group, morale rose and efficiency increased. The glider pilots themselves performed every base function under this set-up. This base eventually moved from Ponte Olivo, Sicily to Marcigilana in Italy, the entire unit movement being carried out by glider. The continued success of this Unit convinces me of the validity of this type of organization for glider units. It is essential that the training and briefing for glider units be conducted and controlled by glider personnel.” Col. Manning, 51st Troop Carrier Wing Glider Base

“Glider pilots were quite a problem in the returnee’s outfit since there were so many of them and so little for them to do.” Major Paul Miller, 64th TCG

“It was suggested that glider pilots be attached to the Airborne Infantry outfits with whom they will be working. Not only would such an arrangement allow the pilots to become more familiar with operations which follow after a landing but it would provide some continuity in the duties and training of these pilots. Under present conditions a glider pilot has nothing to do for long internals between glider operations which tends to make him become lax and out of condition.” Major Gordon E. Heing, Pilot, Sqdn Operations and CO 61st TCS, 314th TCG

“It was the practice in this unit to use the glider pilots as co-pilots on administrative missions, but never to use them in this capacity in tactical operations. There was some training of glider pilots between missions, but this was spasmodic and not very formally planned. For spare time employment the glider pilots were utilized for administrative tasks such as mess officers, motor pool officer, assistant to the Adjutant, etc.” Captain Kenyon, Pilot 7th Sq., 62nd TCG.

“It was impossible, said the returnee, to keep the glider pilots busy or give them sufficient flying time. He suggests they receive the same training as the airborne infantry.” No name, squadron or group listed.

“Between missions the glider pilots engaged in training, attended ground school and acted as co-pilots on Troop Carrier Aircraft.” No name, squadron or group listed.

“This returnee feels that generally their [glider pilots] time was more or less completely wasted. He states that a few with initiative and interest were useful in spare time administrative capacities and in the training of enlisted men, but that the large majority of glider pilots did practically nothing. He adds, too, that in his opinion their presence in a troop carrier unit is a demoralizing influence; and his recommendation is the glider units be maintained entirely separate from troop carrier units and that glider pilots be constantly trained in combat duties instead of spasmodically, as they necessarily are within troop carrier groups . . . In general, with regard to glider operations this returnee is dubious of their practicality as a desirable means for landing troops in combat. He feels there might be some value for landing, gliders under unusual circumstances behind our own lines . . .” Captain Chiodo, no squadron or group listed.

It is evident from the above comments that some Troop Carrier Groups made attempts to incorporate the glider pilots into their organization while in others very little effort was made. An attributing factor, and one that would complicate matters, was the many glider pilots frequently placed on “detached service”. They were basically loaned from their group or squadron to another for a mission. For the 314th TCG glider pilots detached service was routine until the last glider mission of the war, Varsity, the first mission the 314th towed gliders on a mission. As a consequence these particular glider pilots were always on detached service.

In the Glider Pilot Interrogation Reports, the returning glider pilots state their dissatisfaction with detached service. It meant they were flying missions with tow pilots, crews, other glider pilots/copilots of unknown skill to them as well as operating under unknown commanding officers. The KIA list was high for glider pilots and when viewed through the lense of the comments above, it is plausible that the glider pilots had valid reasons for their cautionary approach.

By the time of Operation MARKET- GARDEN glider pilots may or may nor have been involved in the previous missions of Sicily, Normandy and Southern France. Those that did had experience in survival and were experienced in combat. So this was not a complete batch of virgin pilots on their first mission. Given the wide range of attempts at organization and inclusion of the glider pilots within the AAF and TCC it is understandable why they were coined “Mavericks”, as a method of calling out their reputations for being independent and strong willed by the military.

Soldiers’ grumblings were not exclusive to the glider pilots. We see it with the airborne in Normandy and especially after the Battle of the Bulge. The military apparatus had to turn many men, men who did not join the military out of desire but were drafted or it offered economic opportunity to those struggling in the civilian sector, into a cohesive operating unit. Like today there were also people that just like to complain. However, when the same complaints are made throughout the war and in large numbers with the same issues being raised again and again, up the chain of command - they have to be given some credence.

THE OFFICERS IN COMMAND

Gliders as far as the eye can see in Holland Photo courtesy of Fold 3

In the episode on the 313th Troop Carrier Group (TCG) I made mentioned of Major Hugh J. Nevins. There was also another key player involved with the glider pilots in Holland, Captain Elgin D. Andross, who is less frequently mentioned but also played a major part in the actions of the 313th glider pilots in MARKET. Questions have to be asked about both of these men as well. Who were they? What did they have to do with the glider pilots in Operation MARKET - GARDEN? What was the glider pilots reaction to these men? What were the long term effects of their actions on the glider pilots under their command? Did their actions unduly influence Gavin’s remarks on the all glider pilots that have been latched onto by historians?

The first officer, and one I introduced in the podcast, is Major Hugh J. Nevins. Major Nevins was assigned to Headquarters 50th TCW. He was the senior ranking glider pilot on the MARKET mission, therefore he was in charge of all the glider pilots. Rex Sharma, a WWII glider pilot assigned to the 313th TCG and author of Pulse and Repulse, written shortly after the war, states that “Nevins was not known to glider pilots in the 50th TCW.” Although he was based at headquarters he also appears to have been affected by the military’s disinterest or inability to organize the glider pilots into a cohesive unit. Sharma states that in headquarters Nevins was without staff or formal chain of command.

Sharma goes on to state that the gliders of the 52nd and 50th wings were bringing in supplies and equipment to General Gavin’ 82nd Division in the Nijmegan sector. General Gavin was responsible for all personnel on the ground. This is true. Although glider pilots were with Troop Carrier, they reported to their command posts upon landing. Many reports state the Airborne Officers assigned them duties, released them, refused to release them etc.

This is confirmed by the command report for MARKET:

“Ground Activities of Glider Pilots”

“Upon landing glider pilots of D plus 1 serials made their way to the 82nd A/B division CP and reported to Major Nevins, 50th TC Wing glider pilot. Major Nevins maintained a roster by Group and Serial of all glider pilots reporting. Accurate accounting of glider pilots was difficult at the time because various Airborne officers would come into gliders’ area and enlist their services for specific details without properly coordinating with Group leaders concerned.”

Gavin wrote in a letter addressed his letter to Major General Paul Williams of the IX Troop Carrier Command,

“Dear P.L. . . . Major Nevins was especially helpful, a[nd] conscientious and thorough in his effort to gain and maintain control over the glider pilots present. He did a fine job for me and I am recommending him for a Bronze Star for his meritorious service.”

The letter with the salutation “Dear P.L. may have been of a confidential nature. Then again, considering their positions, maybe not. Gavin goes on to comment on the glider pilots about their lack of organization within TCC confirming what was reported in the Air Intelligence Reports and by the glider pilots.

“They lacked organization of their own because of, they stated, frequent transfer from one Troop Carrier Command to another.”

Gavin’s further review of the glider pilots as ill equipped was also part of this letter which I will address in the next post. It is plausible he was voicing a serious concern in a private manner which was not meant to be attached to the glider pilots in history. It is also plausible that this was part of the power wrangling between the two arms of the service which was ongoing throughout the war.

The issue of a lack of cohesiveness would logically lend itself to glider pilots having a sense of individualism if for no other reason than their own survival. Even the higesst commands were aware of this and the causative factors. If one argues it was not known before, it certainly was after this letter. Gavin continues:

“Despite the instructions which were issued to them to move via command channels to Division Headquarters, they frequently became involved in small unit actions to the extent that it satisfied their passing curiosity, or simply left to visit nearby towns.”

The standing instructions from Troop Carrier Command were for the glider pilots to report to the CP and upon evacuation make haste back to base, by any means possible, to be prepared to fly another mission. It is critical to note here that glider pilots were part of Troop Carrier Command, they were not part of the Airborne forces although they fell under their command on the ground. Glider pilots were in command over higher ranking airborne officers only until the glider was unloaded, then they would fall under the command of a higher ranking officer - often airborne. As it was stated in the Command report on MARKET, they were often tasked with duties by the airborne officers and it was often airborne officers that released them to evacuate from the command post. Again this is covered in great detail in my book Suicide Jockeys: The Making of the WWII Combat Glider Pilot so I will not go into detail here.

Numerous reports I have read have the glider pilots attaching themselves to the airborne to make part of the journey back to their bases in most missions. Proper evacuation procedures were not always set for the glider pilots and at least one mission glider pilots complained that their were no evacuation procedures set for them at all. Many, many reports from MARKET have them hitchhiking separately and in groups to Brussels after their were issues with their evacuations or in an attempt to find the quickest way back to base to prepare to fly additional missions if required. Operation MARKET was short on glider pilots. It is perfectly logical that the glider pilots had to return to their bases asap if there were to be any of them to fly additional missions.

In addition to this the 313th glider pilots were not issued Escape and Evasions kits for MARKET. In the planning documents the plan was to these kits to glider pilots “if any were available.” Apparently there weren’t any for the 313th TCG glider pilots. In the Escape and Evasion Kits were maps, a compass identity papers and foreign currency. So let’s take this apart. Gavin himself, in his letter to Major General Williams, states how many gliders overshot the landing zones because they were not given the green light to release by their tow pilots who towed them further towards German held territory. In the podcast I give a breakdown of where the gliders landed in terms of their assigned landing zones.

The word was out that the Germans were executing airborne and glider pilots on the sport.

“On the Holland mission the big job was to get back. As soon as we landed we were briefed to proceed to the division Command Post of the Ground Forces. We were to work under his control until we were ready to go back, usually in 3 or 4 days. I found it most important to follow this procedure. One reason for our glider pilots getting killed on this particular mission was because they didn’t follow rendezvous orders. They must be trained to follow the SOP given prior to taking off; if they don’t they will stray away and get caught by themselves. We heard that Germans put an order that any airborne troops found were to be killed immediately. In my opinion, they don’t hesitate to kill airborne or glider pilots. The men should go back to the Division Command Post as soon as they can, and follow the orders of the Division Commander. On the Holland mission too many tried to get back any old way, instead of waiting for the ground forces to catch up and take over.” F/O Isaac Rhodes, 441st TCC, 99th TCS.

F/O Rhodes highlights the need for the glider pilots, in their opinion, to attach themselves to the ground forces. However, if they landed in enemy occupied territory or miles from their LZ, their safety was 1) move with airborne troops you hauled in or those you came across until they could connect with friendly forces or 2) get to the command post or 3) if evacuation back to base was an option to pursue that option. More the the point it appears there are several conflicting sets of orders. One is to get back to base any way possible and the second to report to the command post. Reporting to the command post would be the priority but bypassing that if cut off from friendly forces, as some were after the convoy ambush, was perfectly acceptable.

This brings up the second issue. The command post may have been relocated due to the fluid situation on the ground, and even if it was where the glider pilots were briefed it would be, without a compass or a map, or identity papers in the event you were stopped, or currency to trade for directions how were they to find the command post? Was it feasible for the glider pilots to travel as far as twelve miles alone without navigational aids and not hook up with friendly troops - American or British, if they could? Were so many MIA for this reason?

The third is General Gavin’s statement that “they involved themselves in small unit action to the extent of their passing curiosity.” If you have not landed on your assigned LZ and are in the midst of the Germans, do you stick with the airborne in you just hauled in or the ground troops who caught up with you and who have additional arms? Do you fight with them until you can get to an evacuation point or until the situation changes and troops or a jeep are moving back towards friendlier lines or do you go it alone and get to Division CP at all costs? Gavin appears to be saying get to the Division CP at all costs and F/O Rhodes is stressing sticking with the ground troops.

Finally, what were the glider pilots expected to be doing while visiting neighboring towns. Again, without any navigational aides how did they find them? Without money what did they do there? If in fact, they left against orders as is being implied, they would have been AWOL. That would result in a court martial - yet I have yet to find a single case of glider pilots being courtmartialed.

More questions than answers arise when we examine the materials at hand today. In the next post I will go into the actions of Nevins and Andross through the glider pilots view.