Operation MARKET

Updated

This is a written update and replacement of the last podcast on Operation MARKET. It focuses on the glider pilots involved in the Operation MARKET mission as recorded in their Glider Pilot Interrogation Reports, specifically those who went in on D+1 and were pulled to the front lines and their convoy being ambushed. Their narratives are very detailed. Before getting to the glider pilot's reports, I want to note a few things.

Glider Pilot Interrogation Reports were filled out by the glider pilots upon returning from a mission. They are also known as After-Action Reports or Interrogation Check Sheets, the latter commonly listed as an ICS. The questions in them may vary a bit within the Troop Carrier Groups but, for the most part, they can be characterized as a series of questions with and a space for a narrative a the end. It is important to keep in mind that the narratives are what the individual glider pilots personally experienced and can be very detailed. These reports were compiled and analyzed by many levels of command to determine the successes, and weaknesses in the Operation as well as to gain insight in any number of areas. The reports were also only one level of reporting that took place. Unfortunately, not all of these reports survived to the present day.

Although this article will only cover a fraction of the reports originally made, it's clear from them that the individual experiences of the glider pilots on the same missions varied quite a bit. While some glider pilots had smooth landings and were not on the front lines or caught in the ambush when evacuating, others had different experiences. I choose not to edit anything out but to present it as the glider pilots wrote it, including spelling as grammar.

The past Forgotten Archives of History posts and podcasts in the series on Operation MARKET have given a lot of background information on General Gavin and his comments on the glider pilots performance in MARKET. I still maintain that Gavin's comments were unwarranted. It is not known if or when he was made aware of their being ordered to leave most of their equipment behind or if it was at his orders this was done. Regardless, the end result was the glider pilots were ordered to bring one gun per two glider pilots to their frontline positions and leave most of their equipment and rations behind. In contrast to Gavin, the 101st Airborne commanders had a very different opinion of the glider pilots in Operation MARKET. They reported they were indispensable, just the opposite of Gavin's opinion that they were a liability. Sadly, Gavin's comments are the only ones that were attached to the glider pilots. However, it must be noted that Gavin's criticisms came from a private correspondence and in his official report his comments were softened to an extent. I discussed that in more detail in other posts/podcasts on MARKET.

As also discussed in past posts, Major Nevins was a relative unknown quantity to the glider pilots. He was from Headquarters and many of the glider pilots were not at all familiar with him until he was trying to round them up to head for the frontlines. I do not have Major Nevin's side of the events. Many glider pilots were also being grabbed by airborne commanders to work with them or they were told they weren't needed and to find their way back to their base. Other reports, not included here, said that some Glider pilot Groups were much less active than others.

There was a wide disparity in the conditions the glider pilots found themselves in depending upon the day they came in, their landing zone, the timing etc., and the action and events on the ground. The glider pilots had combat training and what looks like a minority had training exercises with the airborne organized by their individual Troop Carrier Group. Yet, there appears to have been a number of conflicting expectations of the glider pilots and repeatedly ignored requests by them for training with the airborne.

Of note is that the MARKET reports echo the same requests that were in previous reports. Specific to the subject matter of today, many glider pilots requested sleeping bags over blankets stating they were easier to carry and for invasion currency and maps. While reading the narratives carefully some of these oft repeated requests, and the consequences of them not being met, will be brought up across a number of their reports.

The first report is that of Flight Officer William Wescoat. F/O Wescoat was in Serial A-50 which consisted of 40 CG-4A's towed by the 61st TCG to LZ "T" on D+1. It was one of the last glider serials of that day - a total of seven serials. F/O Wescoat was assigned to the 61st Troop Carrier Group, 59th Troop Carrier Squadron. He gave a very detailed report of the ten days he was in Holland during Operation MARKET. The reports are not often so detailed but on this mission in particular there were a few that were.

F/O Wescoat took off at 12:38 from Barkston Heath, an RAF airfield located near Grantham in Lincolnshire, England. He was towed by Lieutenant Lindsey. The flight was fine until they entered into Holland. F/O Wescoat reports:

Tow ship hit with flak about 3 min after making Holland landfall. Damaged his left wing, causing us to fly slower and loose the rest of the squadron. Glider tail and left wing were hit with flak. Wescoat # 31 and Lothringer # 32 approached target by ourselves. There was no fighter escort, and the flak and small arms fire was heavy.

We released at 15:48 and landed in the field 51°- 55'- 00" E - American airborne held west side of the field and Germans held the east side. We were shot at with small arms, fire and flak during the approaches and shelled with 88's and mortar after we landed. Glider was hit, but no one was injured.

Unloaded glider with airborne troops and then reported to 82nd Division Command Post at 17:00, met with Wonacott, Lothringer, Snowdon, Shoemacker, Thrash, Avigone, Fields, and Wagner. Bivouac near Division CP dug foxholes, some 88 and mortar fire during the night.

D + 2

13:00 moved to bivouac near Mook Station. Dug foxholes, 14:00 strafed by ME-109's, no rations, 21:00, heavy 88 and mortar fire.

D + 3

09:00 strafed by ME-109s. - There were German tanks in Mook counterattacking we were alerted for a retreat across a canal at Heuman - then to LZ "O" - 17:30 - C-47 and Allied fighters resupplied LZ "O" - 23:30 Major Nevins, 50th Wing moved all GP's of 61st and 313th to front lines against the Reich wold [sic]. Major Nevins said guard would be left over our equipment. We were told just to take weapons, ammunition, and entrenching tools and to leave everything else in our foxholes. We marched to the front lines and "dug in" - F/O's Lothringer, Thrash, Schumacher, Abingdon, Wescoat reported to the 505th Airborne for duty. Dug foxholes and established guards - 88 mortars and small arms fire all night.

D+4

17:00 Germans counterattacked with two Mark V tanks, SP 30-pound gun [self-propelled?] and flak wagon. Tanks got within 2500 yards- attack repulsed at 19:30 - German tanks withdrew - Ate German rations - No American rations or air support all day. During the night, we were shelled with "screaming Mimi's", antipersonnel shells, 88s and mortars.

D+5.

Patrol activity, some 88 and mortar fire. Eating vegetables from nearby farms, cooking with composition "C" dynamite to avoid smoke, no air support. During morning Germans attacking with mortars and 88s. 15:00 British rations arrived, corned beef, hardtack, and tea. 17:00 American fighters strafed Germans and had dogfight with Me 109s. 18:00 heavy German fire all night - screaming Mimi’s, 88s, Howitzers 20 m [sic]. Caught hell all night until 07:00

D+6.

Went to bivouac area at Mook Station to pick up equipment left there - Everything had been stolen. Major Nevins, 50th Wing had not supplied adequate guards for our equipment. We were relieved at the front by glider pilots from the 50th Wing after we had heard that the 325th Airborne Infantry was on the way in - 61st GPs moved to the Bivouac area near the battalion CP ate German rations quiet night.

D+7

10:30 departed bivouac area under Captain Andros, the 313th, 61st, 440th, 441st, [arrived?] Nimajen [sic] [Nijmegen] at 11:30 Captain Andros of the 313th glider pilots had put us on the wrong convoy. We had to dig in the woods and wait for a convoy in the rain. Departed Nimejan [sic]15:00 in American trucks. 17:00 convoy was ambushed by Germans 2 miles west of Veghel, Holland. They had Tiger tanks, 200 german infantry, and SP. 30 Pounder. There was arms fire from the west, plus heavy artillery fire from north. 3 English tanks and 3 trucks from our convoy were knocked out, so we hid in the hedgerow and then went back to Veghel under fire. We assembled our convoy in Veghel at 19:00 we started back with the trucks we had left and spent the night in Uden with the 101st Airborne and Catholic School.

D + 8

315- ME 109's strafed Uden. No casualties in bivouac area. Spent the day sweating out the roadblock. Germans controlled the highway east and west of Uden. We were in a pocket. 17:00 the English 7th Armored Division broke the roadblock. The 101st Airborne are mopping up the infantry. We ate English rations all day. 17:30, we moved into German barracks a quiet night in Uden. Heavy fighting in Veghel, three miles away.

D +9

Rations few and far between. Germans retreating to the north. 14:00, our convoy left Uden arrived Vegehel[sic] 14:30. Northbound traffic has the right of way. Departed Veghel, 15:30, and Brussels 20:00, reported to the town major and received an army billet at the Cologne, Colony Hotel and ate at Army Mess at the Palace Hotel. Curfew in Brussels 23:59

D+10

07:30 had breakfast at Palace hotel reported to the airport at 08:30 takeoff 12:30, landed Cottesmore Airport, England at 15:30 - takeoff Cottesmore 16:30 arrived Barkstow Heath 17:00.

Captain Andross is named in F/O Wescoat's report as the one who was leading the glider pilots that were in the convoy. Captain Andross was in Serial A-38, the second serial to land on D+1 with 41 other CG-4a's of the 313th TCG in the serial landing on LZ "N". Captain Andross reported that he encountered no obstacles in the field other than the enemy. He went on to report the enemy fire was coming from one half mile to the south, coming north side of LZ "N" and Germany. His landing was normal, he had to set immediately upon his skids and the glider suffered slight damage to its nose. He went on to comment the airborne were "sweating out "the landing because they had cracked up in a previous glider mission.

Andross, who was prior infantry also stated they needed maps of the area.

In his narrative Andross stated he used his:

. . drag chute and approached the field, deliberately overshooting the larger field and landing in the smaller field beyond so remainder of formation could have a better shot at a large field. A large number of were fanned out on three fields to my rear. LZ was under fire as we landed. Germans were approximately a half a mile from the landing spot and on the northern end of LZ. Mortar and artillery fire was small arms fire most of the time. Reported to Division CP the next day where I picked up most of my men. All but four accounted for.

Pilots did excellent work in picking up equipment, ammo, and food for Division, also in guarding prisoners of war. On the night that the enemy broke through at Mook we (the 313th with 73 men, and the 61st with 25 men for reserve) were pulled into the front lines. Here we stayed for 3 nights and 2 days in line with the 505th Parachute Regiment. We were relieved by members of the other groups on the third day.

Two days later, we started for Brussels, only to be caught in the roadblock between Veghel and Eindhoven. Here, the 313th saved the convoy of 17 vehicles after a preceding British convoy of Approximately 25 vehicles had been destroyed by the enemy. All this was under fire and at close range. When the roadblock was removed, we proceeded and eventually arrived at 484.

Andross does not provide a lot of detail regarding their time on the front lines or the ambush but what was apparent from the reports is that some of the glider pilots were separated from the rest depending on where they were in the convoy and where the ambush damaged the convoy trucks. The glider pilots did form up and perform a flanking maneuver and manage to inch up, unhitch the trailers and slowly back the trucks up under direct fire.

The next narrative is from Flight Officer Lothringer, which Flight Officer Wescoat mentioned as landing with him on the same LZ when they lost the squadron. Here again, the request is made for sleeping bags, more rations and more maps covering larger areas, Of interest is his comment that they would like to train with the airborne in the field. This is important because it had been discussed but was found to be logistically impossible earlier in the program, this resulted in each Group being responsible for providing training to the glider pilots without much oversight. It must be made clear, many glider pilots were well versed in fighting, and some TCGs had trained with airborne at some point but again the point being made here is that to fight well with the airborne as an integrated unit, the glider pilots needed to train with them if they were going to be put in the front lines with them. This is a point that General Gavin made and one on which I agree.

Flight Officer Lothringer was a member of the 61st Troop Carrier group, 59th Troop Carrier Squadron. He flew on D+1 in Serial A-50, the 6th serial of the day with a landing zone of "T" assigned.

D+1

12:38 takeoff from Barkston Heath towed by Lt. Cole, TCS flying on the wing of Lt. Lindsay. Lt. Lindsay's ship was hit by flak about three minutes inland of Holland which caused him to lose airspeed and also lost sight of squadron. Flew on the wing of F/O Wescoat into the LZ, which was under enemy fire during the approach and landing. We released at 15:48 at an altitude of 1500 m.

After landing, we unloaded the glider under fire and reported to the 320th assembly area. Later reported to division CP at 17:00 met Wonacott - Lothringer, Snowdon, Schumaker, Thrash Avigone, Fields and Wagner, At 20:00 F/O Shoemaker and I were called on to guard POW and weren't released until 10:00 the next day.

D+2

12:00 we moved to a plane near Mook station where we dug in. Around 14:00, we were strafed by 18 (?) ME-109s, no rations for the day. 20:00, heavy 88 fire, 22:00 till 08:00, guarded POW.

D+3

D plus 3, 09:00 strafed by ME-109's and at 13:00 was alerted for retreat to LZ - O as German tanks entered Mook. 23:30, we were moved to the front lines. We were told by Major Nevins to take guns and ammo only and to leave the rest of our equipment, and he would place guards around the area. We were on duty with 505th Paras. We dug in with the 88s and mortar fire following around the area.

D+4

Position was reinforced with English tanks. 17:00 Germans counterattacked with 2 MK IV's and flug wagons [sic] the fire was about 2500 yards away. Attack was repulsed at 19:30 and at 20:00, the English tank moved out. German rations, no American rations, shelled all night by 88s and screaming Mimi's.

D+5

Shelled all day with 88's and screaming Meme's [sic] Shelled all day and few American and German fighter planes had dogfights, heavy shell all night.

D+6

Went to Mook station to bring up rest of equipment, but all that was left, was one raincoat and one blanket. Major Nevins hadn't supplied enough guard to protect our equipment as promised. 14:00 was relieved from front lines by glider pilots of the 50th Troop Carrier Wing.

D+7

10:30 departed Division CP on English trucks under command of Captain Andross, who knew that we were loading on the wrong trucks. Road to English trucks for three and a half hours and were put off near Nijmegen where later we were picked up by American trucks. We were ambushed by the Germans who were cutting the road near Veghel, three trucks were lost.

D+8

Spent the day in the schoolhouse in Uden waiting for the road to be cleared. No rations of any kind.

D+ 9

Still no rations, loaded on trucks at 14:00 to go to Veghel as the Germans were retreating out of Veghel. The road cleared at 15:30, so we departed Brussels. The truck convoy stopped at Leopold, so we caught a British truck to Brussels. The town mayor didn't like the idea of us stopping in town overnight.

D+10

Left Brussels at 12:00 and was home by 17:00.

F/O Lothringer pretty much reinforces what Wescoat stated in his report. He also confirms the names given by Wescoat. This is important because this gave information that can confirm the missions of one glider pilot that was unknown and gives information on another that was previously unknown. Captain Andross was well thought of by his men and was prior infantry, so it is hard to say what he knew about the convoy at the time since he did not comment on it.

In this next report the focus is on the landing field and the chaos and bitter fighting that often awaited the glider pilots upon landing. The conditions on the ground was one of the factors that influenced their landing strategy.

The report is from H.G. Abbott. It is incomplete; however, the narrative is intact. I cannot say what serial he flew in on or his rank. The report was filed with the 61st Troop Carrier Group so he may have belonged or at least flew with them on detached service. However, that is not definite. The one issue he did have was with communications in that he was never given the signal for his glider to cut off. That could be because they tow pilot had not located the LZ, the lights weren't working on the tow plane, the pilot was injured - there is not enough information without more research to state why, but we know he did not see a signal to cut off at his LZ.

Takeoff was good. Flak was encountered several times while passing over Holland. Was released beyond our LZ and encountered flak and small arms fire in air. Had half aileron shot off on way down. After landing, small fire weapons opened and was forced to take to a ditch after ten or fifteen minutes unloaded glider and was fired upon again and glider set on fire by incendiaries. Again took to ditch, and after a short period of being fired on by light arms Germans set up what seemed to be 20 MRs and fired down ditch at us. Left ditch and went into the drainage ditch where the Germans again set up the gun. Left and crossed some level ground. Ground under fire to another drainage ditch and out to high ground as it was now dark. Lost Germans after about 20 minutes.

Walked in SW direction. Patrol went to a farmhouse and got directions to Grosbeek. walked all night and arrived in Grosbeek at around 3:30 the following morning. Was fired on several times during the night by snipers, reported to Division CP and was sent with the rest of the glider pilots to the wooded area. Volunteered for duty and was assigned to guarding prisoners, left Monday and after a scary trip, stopped for the night at Leopold, Belgium. Hitchhiked to Brussels airport next morning and caught the C-47 back to Barkston Heath and arrived safe and sound. Thank God.

The trip in question may have been the ambush that Wescoat and Lothringer were caught in.

The next report is a good example of the how the glider pilots received their communications as to the action on the ground, at the Command Post etc.. Remember they are to report to CP but once released get back to base asap in case they were needed to fly another mission. Glider pilots were in very short supply for MARKET which is why they flew without co-pilots on this mission. The report is by Robert Keaton, and is another partial report filed with the 61st TCG.

Route was flown at scheduled altitude. When [around?] Uden, something happened to the tow ship so cut loose. On landing in soft ground, ropes broke from the trailer and broke both seats with no damage to the personnel, but the nose of glider was torn out. Didn't go to CP because we started the next morning at 9-24-44 and met some of the glider pilots that had been there and told me there was no use in going. So went to an English tank corp(?). Went back with the English tank and got the load out of the glider. No damage done. Went to Eindhoven, caught the convoy to Brussels. From there, caught the plane and was back in England.

Another Interrogation Report is from a glider pilot in serial A-40. He's with the 61st TCG, 14th TCS assigned to LZ "T". Once again on his form he is asking for invasion currency and once again we are given a view of landing conditions.

Landed approximately 4-5 miles in Germany. Upon landing, we were not under immediate enemy fire, but in a nearby farmhouse, the enemy soon brought out 20 mm guns and several rifles, at least, we were pinned down in the ditches, bordering the field, while our gliders were set afire by tracer from the 20mm. When darkness arrived, we made our way through the fields to a town “Wyler" I believe, and inquired the way to Groesbeck and was given accurate information. Made our way along a large lake and found that no bridge crossed it. We retraced our course, and crossed highway, skirting a small village. At this time, we were headed for the RR tracks leading to Grossbek [sic] while getting [returning] in a field, a German soldier, intent on getting back to Germany, stumbled into our party. After questioning him in German and Polish, we decided to take him with us, but it was found out that he gave faulty information so I shot him and we then proceeded to the railroad tracks which led us to an American outpost. We stayed there till morning and made our way to Grossbeck.

To modern day sensibilities his statement about shooting the German soldier sounds brash. But the fighting was brutal and the Germans had been given standing orders to shoot airborne and glider pilots on site. Many airborne and glider pilots saw what had been done to their fellow soldiers and did not give any quarter afterwards. This was also the case in the Battle of the Bulge as well.

Flight Officer Jesse Davis of the 313th TCG, 49th TCS had a communication system that didn't work. However, that did not stop him. He went on to say in regard to locating his target "Hit that target perfect."

After the formation was complete, I was next to the last glider in the formation. After crossing the Dutch coast, I could see flak burst in the formation, but we were flying to the right of the formation and flak was very close to us. The flak died down for about 30 minutes after it crossed the coast, then started again getting heavier towards the LZ and was very heavy around the LZ. After cutting, I made a 360° pattern and landed in a soft plowed field. The LZ was being fired on by machine guns and mortars, (maybe some 88's). After getting out of the glider, I layed on the ground for a while, then made my way to a house in the middle of the LZ. On one side of the house was six clumps of trees about 50 yards wide and 100 yards long. I joined Lt. Van Sickland there. We were sitting by a tree when a mortar hit a few feet away. Lt. Van Sickland was fatally wounded. I heard the next morning that he had died during the night at the hospital. I believe he was wounded in the head. I was uninjured.

I stayed at the house that night and I joined the other glider pilots the next morning. We moved down the road about 3 or 4 miles south of Divisional CP staying there one night and left in the middle of the next night.

The rest of the night we spent moving up to the front lines where we spent the next three days. We were being evacuated by Sunday, and I was fired upon for about 2 or 3 miles south of Veghel where the Germans had managed to close the road. We moved back up the road to Veghel, spending the night.

The next morning, we would back up to Uden where we spent the night. I was separated from my squadron when they left the next day by convoy for Brussels. I saw C-47s landing about 15 miles to the north, so I made my way to the field, got on one, and came home.

These reports really exemplify how it was each man for himself with the glider pilots finding their way back to base individually or in groups. What is obvious is that they were savvy enough to do it without the supplies that other members of the ground forces did not have.

Flight Officer Robert Hills report states he was with the 133 TCG but he transposed two figures and it was the 313th TCG, 29th TCS. He also flew in serial A-38 and landed in a cultivated beet field. He lost his landing gear and rolled about 50 feet to the left. Fortunately, he had chosen a slow approach landing. The airborne in his glider remained very calm under fire and unloading. He commented the glider pilots needed more maps and more emphasis on job and behavior on the ground, infantry defensive tactics. Of concern is his request that glider pilots and power pilots be briefed together.

"We were not even briefed on the password, had to get it from the pilot on the intercom."

If that is the case these men were severely handicapped. They were without maps, invasion currency and passwords, however, the power pilots which were flying out of the area were provided all those things while the glider pilots, who were tasked to operate on the ground in enemy territory, were not.

F/O Hills report states:

Take off at 11:25, encountered some scud (?) on the deck, pulled up through, formed over Cottesmore and headed enroute. We hit all the ETAs on schedule. Hit light flak at landfall. Saw two Spitfires firing on barge in Canal. Then there was return fire. We experienced light, inaccurate flak from the South on Holland proper. Light flak at IP and Summit LZ. I cut it approximately 14:30 at about 900' from low tow position. A 360° pattern got me on the ground. The landing gear was washed out on landing and in the soft earth of a cultivated sugar beet field, we immediately took cover from machine gun and mortar fire. About 20 minutes later, we unloaded the glider.

The trailer was undamaged. Our Jeep came by, and I said goodbye to the medics. At the CP that night, I volunteered for a supply gathering detail. Next morning, Tuesday, guarded some prisoners and was relieved at noon and was sent to the GP Pool. That evening, we were strafed by 12 ME-109s. Next morning, I was strafed by FW 190s, about 2200, Thursday night, September 21st, we were moved to the front lines to hold off possible attack. Our location was the south end of the LZ "N". Germany proper was across the LZ. No direct assaults were experienced, just fairly heavy mortar and 88-millimeter fire was experienced.

We were relieved Sunday night, September 24th, and met a convoy Monday noon to evacuate us. We were under the orders of Captain Andross. That evening, just after we crossed the canal of Veghel, our convoy was hit by 2 self-propelled 88 mm fire and approximately 100 German paratroopers. Our trucks were scattered. Many trucks ahead were ablaze, and 3 Sherman tanks that reinforced us were knocked out. A British truck driver was hit in the ribs. I dressed his wounds during this, the truck that was on the road, behind my former position was that of Flight Officer R. L. Franks, and William Crehan was hit and ablaze, cutting off any communication between us. I saw an S.P. and a few Germans filtering through the woods. About 20 minutes later, a jeep came up and took the wounded English soldier to the hospital. I didn't learn his name. I lost contact with the rest of the GPs. I met some 327th Infantry boys, stayed with them that night. Met with other G.P. in Uden the next day. The road was open about 13:00 hours on Tuesday, and F/O Fosberg and I got transportation to Brussels, arriving there about 21:00 hours that evening. We went to airport the next morning and found transportation back to 434 by some 315th TCG planes.

Flight Officer Luedtke is also mentioned in Wescoat's narrative. He was with the 313th TCG, 29th TCS, Serial A- 38, assigned to LZ "N". He commented that the airborne needed more flying time to become accustomed to the glider in fight and landing. Interestingly he notes that the glider pilots need a definite place to report to as the Command Post was not where it was located in the briefings. He also comments on the convoy ambush, and we can see through the command reports on the glider pilots in MARKET discussed in an earlier post and these narratives the chaos of that ambush.

Flight to LZ was successful. Encountered flak in three places. A tow plane in right element shot down in flames. Landing on the LZ-N was slow in a soft plowed field Had to make a 360° overhead to lose altitude, determine wind, and clear other gliders. Used chute to slow as much as possible and stopped in 50 yards, no damage. Field was under enemy fire. Airborne and pilots cleared glider immediately and observed from trees and farmhouse about 1/4 mile away. Took airborne back and unloaded after about 30 minutes. Returned to trees and Jerry started zeroing in on our area. Three other glider pilots came in and four of us ended up going in the direction of the CP. Came to a town of Grosbeak, which was under enemy artillery fire. Obtained more directions as to the location of the CP. Continued on. Getting dark. No C.P. Enemy shelling getting worse, stayed in foxhole with airborne engineers, about 2 miles from CP.

Morning second day Jerries from wrecked, train walked in and surrendered. Airborne took them to CP, we followed, guarded at CP, directed us to the glider pilot area, another two miles, arrived 13:00 after a couple of failed leads.

Guarded prisoners from 18:00 19-9-44 until 10:00 20-9-44. Returned to GP area at 23:00 20-9-44, walked to a sector held by the 505th in front lines, relieved from front line duties at 14:00, 23-9-44. Returned to the marshalling area for evacuation and remained. On 24-9-44, 10:00 hours boarded trucks for trucks for Brussels. Wrong damn trucks, tried to take us to another front Commanding Officer didn't check their direction. Returned to crossroads to wait for right convoy. Convoy left 13:00. Passed through Veghel approximately 15:30. Two miles beyond Veghel convoy halted by German’s ambush. Jumped from the ditch to ditch and finally retreated in direction of Veghel, sans most of equipment. Remained overnight in Veghel in Dutch barn. Straw is as good as a feather tick.

25-9- 44, gathered, remaining convoy, returned to Uden, stayed overnight in German barracks, now vacated. Convoy left Uden for Brussels again about 12:00. Waited until 15:00 till road was cleared again and drove like hell for Brussels. We reached Leopold about 21:00, remained overnight.

End of the convoy route, had to get other transportation to Brussels. 27-9-44 left Leopold at 07:30, hitched a ride on RAF truck directly to Brussels airfield arriving at about 10:00. Found C-47s coming to Cottesmore. Took off about 12:45 arrived Cottesmore at 15:40. Deplaned. Plane decided to bring us to Folkingham and arrived about 16:15.

Flight Officer Anthony Colaccino of the 313th TCG, 49th TCS, Serial A-38 reported a very smooth flight to LZ "N" but chronicles the fierce fighting on the ground. He continued:

The flight was very smooth at the DZ N [sic]. The first thing I saw was green smoke signal indicating the field, and also the wind direction, which was from the East. Had my load out in eight minutes and on its way in 10 minutes.

Took me three and a half hours to cross the field under enemy fire to the CP. Was put on detail to gather bundles of resupply of ammo. After that, went to, or rather was ordered to the front line to form a defense for the airborne. Was on the front line till Saturday, September 23rd, when we were relieved of duty. In trying to be evacuated, we were ambushed by the enemy at Udgen [sic]. The glider pilots saved the convoy of vehicles. The block lasted 48 hours. Our salvation was the natural ditches along the highway and the enemy not being able or was not able to zero in on the ditch. This was worse than being on the front lines for we were so much closer to the fire of the enemy. The Dutch people received us with open arms and did all they could to make our arrival a welcome one. The orange flag of Holland waves once again.

We were actually under enemy fire for 8 days and 7 nights. Were strafed one evening and one morning by 2 FW 190 and 2 ME 109. The experience on the front line was a great help when we were ambushed by the enemy for, we knew what to do and what was expected. So, we thank God, that we are safe and back to Merry old England once again. Am ready for another mission, but don't care to stay for 10 days. Would like to be evacuated much sooner.

This last report is by no means the end of the glider pilot's stories of MARKET but only a fraction of them. Glider Pilot Interrogation Reports tell a personal tale of time in flight and combat, and there is an additional value to these reports. I am a researcher with the National World War II Glider Pilot Association, and we use these reports to fill in a glider pilot's records in the database. The reports can help fill in information that may not be available any longer and key to saving the glider pilot from disappearing from history such as the case with Wonacott mentioned above. The reports also provide families with knowledge of what their veteran relation did in the war and provide important research materials for historians. Many of the documents are not available in the archives and are provided by family members. By saving them and sharing it they are saving history.